The completion of Ukraine’s protracted government reshuffle has restored President Volodymyr Zelensky’s immediate political control. The Verkhovna Rada’s confirmation of the final two ministers—including Yevhenii Khmara as defense minister with an emphatic 312 votes—demonstrated that the presidential administration can still assemble a broad parliamentary majority when the issue is essential.

The vote also brought to a halt the revolt by Mykhailo Fedorov. With a late night video calling for elections, the former defense minister and his supporters had sought to derail Khmara’s appointment. Instead, opposition factions in the parliament joined the governing majority, voting not only for the new minister, but also against Fedorov’s attempt to transform his personal conflict with the president into a broader political campaign.

The following day, however, the anti-corruption agencies charged Iryna Mudra, deputy head of the presidential administration, with money laundering. In combination with an investigation into Ukraine’s former ambassador to the United States, Olha Stefanishyna, this episode exposed the underlying fragility of Zelensky’s governing model. Although the president himself remains unchallenged, investigations surrounding his office are becoming instruments of pressure, mutual deterrence, and political competition. The system can still sacrifice individuals, redirect allegations, and fight back, but it is gradually losing its ability to control the wider process.

Zelensky’s tactical victory has also created a more consequential political problem. Fedorov is the first senior figure from the president’s original 2019 team to break publicly with him during the full-scale war. Even if poorly prepared and unsuccessful, his revolt transformed a personnel dispute into an open political confrontation, and created a potentially formidable opponent for Zelensky.

Fedorov appears to have believed that his high approval ratings, public reputation as a successful modernizer, relationships with anti-corruption activists, Western connections, and support among parts of the defense-technology sector would force Zelensky to reinstate Fedorov as defense minister. Weeks of protests following his removal seemed to reinforce that expectation. His supporters also believed that the possibility of further anti-corruption investigations against presidential officials would complicate the parliamentary vote for Khmara.

They miscalculated. Khmara’s overwhelming confirmation demonstrated that Fedorov’s public popularity had not translated into parliamentary influence. Khmara’s reputation as a wartime hero made opposing his appointment particularly difficult, while opposition parties had little interest in strengthening a new political contender. Even some of Fedorov’s natural allies feared that his campaign placed his personal ambitions above wartime stability.

Fedorov’s August 18 video address, in which he accused the authorities of systemic corruption and dysfunctional governance and called for a public discussion about holding elections during the war, revealed the limits of his operation. It was released late at night, immediately before the parliamentary vote, without an obvious coalition, organizational structure, or credible proposal for how elections could be conducted during active hostilities: something that polling shows a majority of Ukrainians oppose while the war continues.

Zelensky won the immediate battle. He completed the reshuffle, retained control of parliament, and demonstrated that neither public protests nor Fedorov’s personal popularity could overturn a presidential decision.

Still, it would be a mistake to dismiss Fedorov as a failed rebel. By leaving the government rather than accepting another appointment, he has crossed a political line that other senior members of Zelensky’s team have avoided since February 2022. He is not merely a dismissed minister, but a national figure openly questioning the competence, legitimacy, and strategic direction of the war. 

His criticism also resonates with the public. Ukrainians are frustrated by corruption, coercive mobilization, and the absence of a persuasive explanation of where the war is going. Moreover, Fedorov departed dramatically from Kyiv’s official rhetoric by arguing that Ukraine was “gradually, slowly losing.” His insistence that Ukraine lacks an overall theory of victory will find an audience in a society that remains determined to resist Russia but is increasingly skeptical of the government’s management of the war.

Thus, Fedorov has reopened questions that the political system had temporarily suppressed: whether Zelensky still possesses a sufficient mandate for an indefinite war, whether the government can be renewed without elections, and whether national unity can withstand corruption.

These issues will not disappear just because Fedorov introduced them clumsily. His strategy appears to be based on the expectation that Ukraine’s military and economic position will deteriorate over the next six to twelve months. If that happens, voters may retrospectively credit him with having warned that the country needed a new political and military strategy.

Yet Fedorov has a credibility challenge. He joined Zelensky’s team in 2019 and served at its highest levels for seven years. His denunciation of “total corruption” came only after he lost his ministerial position and failed to secure reinstatement. Fedorov’s account may contain uncomfortable truths, but his timing allows the presidential administration to portray his revolt as an act of personal resentment.

He also faces strong competition. In the polls, former commander-in-chief Valerii Zaluzhny remains the most obvious alternative to Zelensky, while former military intelligence chief-turned-presidential administration head Kyrylo Budanov and several prominent commanders possess their own political constituencies. Fedorov has support among liberal civil society, younger urban voters, and parts of the defense-technology community, but that is not yet a national coalition. A communications-driven, pro-business candidate would struggle to expand beyond this relatively narrow base without support from the military, regional elites, and established opposition forces.

The greater threat to Zelensky comes not from Fedorov alone, but from the convergence between his political campaign and the anti-corruption investigations moving ever closer to the presidential administration. The case against its former deputy head, Mudra, is important in this context. Zelensky dismissed Mudra quickly, reinforcing an established presidential tactic: individuals can be sacrificed to prevent investigations from reaching the center of the system.

The timing of the case—hours before Khmara’s confirmation—also intensified suspicions that parts of the anti-corruption apparatus had entered the political struggle surrounding Fedorov. Some anti-corruption activists who previously opposed wartime elections began supporting a debate on them after his dismissal. Parts of this community now appear to regard Fedorov as their ultimate political vehicle.

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office remain essential constraints on the consolidation of presidential power and the corruption accompanying it. Yet they operate within Ukraine’s political environment, not outside it. Their institutional mandate is to investigate and prosecute, but their growing reliance on strategic communication, selective disclosure, and the political timing of cases allows them to influence political outcomes.

This makes them inherently political actors, even when the underlying investigations are legitimate. Competing factions cultivate relationships with investigators and exploit the resulting cases for political leverage. This dynamic is reinforced by the longstanding institutional rivalry between the newer specialized anti-corruption agencies and the security services under presidential oversight.

The result is disruption, but not necessarily accountability or systemic reform. Anti-corruption enforcement can remove officials, expose illicit arrangements, and weaken the presidential administration’s ability to protect its allies. Investigations and disclosures consequently become instruments of pressure and mutual deterrence within the elite, further fragmenting state institutions without necessarily reforming them.

The same distinction applies to Fedorov. His revolt disrupted Zelensky’s system, but it has not yet offered a political alternative to it. A former central participant in presidential governance, backed by parts of the anti-corruption ecosystem, does not by definition represent institutional renewal. Ukraine is witnessing the weakening of an existing order, not its cleansing.

The presidential administration believes the situation is under control and, in a narrow sense, it is right. Zelensky has completed his reshuffle and retained control over both the cabinet and parliament. Military leaders associated with the nationalist camp backed Zelensky, while his principal political rivals continued to operate within the presidential system. Fedorov’s call for elections failed to generate a broad social movement, European partners continue to prioritize wartime continuity, and the Ukrainian public remains wary of political competition during active hostilities.

But control should not be confused with stability. The president can still manage each crisis separately, but the system is less capable of reversing the cumulative deterioration that produces these crises. Meanwhile, the military situation is becoming more dangerous in strategically important areas. Ukraine is losing part of its mid-range technological advantage as Russia improves its ability to disrupt Starlink internet. The defense budget deficit is widening, attacks on ports and storage facilities are damaging exports and private business, and dependence on external financing continues to grow. Infighting has become routine inside the governing team, while anti-corruption agencies increasingly shape political competition.

Winter may temporarily suppress these tensions as society again concentrates on physical survival. Ukraine will almost certainly continue to resist and may once again prove more resilient than pessimistic forecasts suggest. But its margin for error is shrinking. The government faces worsening trends across virtually every critical field—governance, military, fiscal, economic, and political—while public confidence in its ability to change course is declining. The president has restored control over the government while losing something harder to recover: the unity of the political system he created.